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Rapid Diagnosis of 
Pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 in Cuba
To the Editor: During 2005–
2008, the Cuban National Inﬂ  uenza 
Center (NIC) at the Pedro Kourí 
Institute in Havana, Cuba, 
implemented a protocol for inﬂ  uenza 
surveillance proposed by the Pan 
American Health Organization and 
the US Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (1). One of the most 
essential features of this protocol was 
strengthening laboratory capacity for 
surveillance of seasonal inﬂ  uenza and 
timely detection of a new inﬂ  uenza 
virus with pandemic potential.
On April 26, 2009, in response 
to an outbreak of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 in Mexico, NIC proposed 
an algorithm with 2 phases for 
processing specimens. The purpose 
of the algorithm was to identify the 
novel virus, effectively monitor its 
circulation in Cuba, and make these 
data available to the national health 
authorities and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) (2).
The ﬁ  rst phase of the algorithm 
was used during April–September 
2009. Following the recommendations 
of WHO (3), this phase included 
ﬂ  uorescent antigen tests, nucleic acid 
extraction by using QIAamp Viral 
RNA and QIAamp Viral DNA Kits 
(QIAGEN, Hilden, Germany), and 3 
reverse transcription PCR (RT-PCR) 
assays for typing and subtyping of 
inﬂ   uenza A viruses. RT-PCRs were 
used for differential diagnoses, which 
included 15 other respiratory viruses 
(4–7).
At the same time, on the basis of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus sequences 
published on the Global Initiative on 
Sharing Avian Inﬂ  uenza Data website 
(http://platform.gisaid.org/dante-
cms/struktur.jdante?aid=1131), we 
designed a primer set speciﬁ  c for the 
hemagglutinin gene and we developed 
an in-house, conventional RT-PCR 
was designed to enable virus-speciﬁ  c 
identiﬁ  cation.  Conﬁ  rmation  was 
performed by subsequent sequencing 
of hemagglutinion, nucleoprotein, 
or neuraminidase genes by using the 
BigDye Terminator Cycle Sequencing 
Quick Start Kit (Beckman Coulter 
Inc., Krefeld, Germany).
Several sequences obtained 
were submitted to GenBank under 
accession nos. HM159409–159418 
and HM176606–HM17639) (8,9). 
BLAST (www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
BLAST/) search analysis on 
sequences obtained from the ﬁ  rst 
cases identiﬁ  ed indicated the highest 
alignment score (>98% identity) with 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus strains.
The second phase of the algorithm 
was used during September 2009–
August 2010. This phase included 
automated nucleic acid extraction 
(QIAcube; QIAGEN) and real-time 
RT-PCR kits (Pan American Health 
Organization, Washington, DC, USA, 
and Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA) for 
detection and characterization of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus (10).
During January 3–July 31, 2009, 
a total of 2,156 specimens were 
submitted to the NIC for inﬂ  uenza 
surveillance. During January 2009–
August 10, 2010, a total of 14,692 
clinical samples were processed. In 
the next 6 months, the number of 
specimens submitted to NIC doubled. 
More specimens (7,978) were 
submitted during January 1–August 
10, 2010, than during all of 2009.
Most (5,601) clinical specimens 
processed were from patients with 
inﬂ   uenza-like illness. The highest 
percentage (45.9%) of inﬂ  uenza-
positive samples was detected in 
specimens from these patients, 
followed by specimens from patients 
during outbreaks (18.0%).
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus 
infection peaked during epidemiologic 
weeks 39–41, 2009 (online Appendix 
Figure, wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/
18/2/11-0547-FA1.htm) and co-
circulated with inﬂ  uenza  A  virus 
(H3N2). This period coincided with 
the start of school. A total of 285 
and 211 specimens were positive for 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus and 
inﬂ  uenza A virus (H3N2), respectively. 
During April 2010, a second peak of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was detected, 
and 303 cases were conﬁ  rmed during 
epidemiologic weeks 13–16 (online 
Appendix Figure).
By the time WHO declared 
the end of the pandemic on August 
10, 2010, public health authorities 
recognized 1,805 cases of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 in Cuba. On the basis of 
laboratory results, during April 2009–
2010, two peaks of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 were observed in Cuba.
During August 2010, Cuba 
experienced active transmission of 
seasonal inﬂ  uenza  A  (H3N2)  virus, 
which displaced pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 virus as the predominant virus. 
Similarly, seasonal inﬂ  uenza  virus 
(H1N1) was displaced by pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus. The last case of 
seasonal inﬂ  uenza (H1N1) detected in 
Cuba was in June 2009.
In this context, we believe 
that implementing national dia-
gnostic algorithm enabled timely 
identiﬁ  cation of the novel virus and 
effective monitoring of its circulation, 
even before international diagnostic 
protocols and reagents were available 
in Cuba. This study shows the need 
for nucleic acid ampliﬁ  cation tools in 
laboratory diagnosis and surveillance 
of inﬂ   uenza viruses. As we prepare 
for future inﬂ  uenza pandemics, new 
and appropriate diagnostic methods 
and periodic assessment of inﬂ  uenza 
surveillance methods are needed as 
new information becomes available.
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Hand, Foot, and 
Mouth Disease 
Caused by Cox-
sackievirus A6, 
Japan, 2011
To the Editor: Coxsackievirus A6 
(CVA6) belongs to human enterovirus 
species A of the genus Enterovirus. 
According to a Japanese Infectious 
Agents Surveillance Report, this 
virus is one of the major causes of 
herpangina, an acute febrile disease 
characterized by vesicles, ulcers, 
and redness around the uvula, which 
occurs mainly in young children and 
infants. (1).
In June 2011, a sudden increase 
in cases of hand, foot, and mouth 
disease (HFMD) at pediatric sentinel 
sites (≈3,000 pediatric hospitals and 
clinics) was reported to the National 
Epidemiologic Surveillance of 
Infectious Diseases System in Japan. 
Compared with past numbers of cases 
over 30 years of surveillance, the 
number of cases of HFMD per sentinel 
site peaked in week 28 (July) of 2011 
(10.97 cases per sentinel), particularly 
in western Japan (2). According to the 
Infectious Agents Surveillance Report 
(as of September, 18, 2011), CVA6 
was detected in 709 HFMD cases 
and 156 herpangina cases throughout 
Japan (1).
Clinical samples (throat swab 
specimens and feces) obtained from 
sentinel sites in Shimane, Hyogo, 
Hiroshima, and Shizuoka, Japan, 
were screened for enteroviruses by 
using an enterovirus-speciﬁ  c reverse 
transcription PCR and sequence 
analysis of the partial viral protein 
(VP)4/VP2 or VP1 region (3). Among 
93 clinical samples from 108 HFMD 
case-patients, we identiﬁ  ed 74 case-
patients as CVA6 positive by sequence 
analysis.
On the basis of sequence 
analysis of the entire VP1 region 
(GenBank accession nos. AB649286–
AB649291), the consensus sequence 
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Letters
Letters commenting on recent articles 
as well as letters reporting cases, 
outbreaks, or original research are 
welcome. Letters commenting on ar-
ticles should contain no more than 
300 words and 5 references; they are 
more likely to be published if submitted 
within 4 weeks of the original article’s 
publication. Letters reporting cases, 
outbreaks, or original research should 
contain no more than 800 words and 
10 references. They may have 1 
Figure or Table and should not be di-
vided into sections. All letters should 
contain material not previously pub-
lished and include a word count.